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PERSPECTIVES ON  
IMMIGRATION REFORM 
Kathleen Kim* 
The United States is home to almost 40 million immigrants, 
representing more than 20 percent of the world’s entire migrant 
population.1 Economic opportunity, religious freedom, and civil and 
political rights have attracted foreign nationals to the United States 
for decades. Our country has benefited from this long history of 
immigration, which has sustained and advanced our economic 
productivity and increased the vibrancy of our diverse society. 
Recent federal governmental policies, however, have had a 
diluting effect on the positive impact of immigration. Concerns about 
terrorism and unauthorized migration have fueled stricter 
enforcement practices at the border and in the interior. Since 2004, 
the Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) budget grew from $6 billion to 
$10.1 billion to support a doubling in the number of border patrol 
agents as well as state of the art virtual fencing and surveillance 
technology.2 According to some commentators, the militaristic 
approach to border enforcement has fueled anti-immigrant hostility, 
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 1. PHILIP MARTIN & ELIZABETH MIDGLEY, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, 
POPULATION BULLETIN UPDATE: IMMIGRATION IN AMERICA 2010, at 1 (2010), available at 
http://www.prb.org/pdf10/immigration-update2010.pdf. 
 2. AARTI KOHLI & DEEPA VARMA, BORDERS, JAILS, AND JOBSITES: AN OVERVIEW OF 
FEDERAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS IN THE U.S. 6 (2011), available at http:// 
www.law.berkeley.edu/files/WI_Enforcement_Paper_final_web%282%29.pdf; U.S. Customs & 
Border Prot., Securing America’s Borders: CBP Fiscal Year 2010 in Review Fact Sheet, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/ 
cbp_overview/fy2010_factsheet.xml. 
 3. See, e.g., Peter Andreas, The Transformation of Migrant Smuggling Across the U.S.-
Mexican Border, in GLOBAL HUMAN SMUGGLING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 107, 112–16 
(David Kyle & Rey Koslowski eds., 2001) (remarking on the negative impact of the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 and subsequent acts); WAYNE A. CORNELIUS, IMPACTS OF 
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border enforcement efforts a success, noting a significant reduction 
in border arrests to indicate fewer unauthorized crossings.4 
Beyond the border, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) continues to aggressively remove unlawfully 
present individuals and “criminal aliens.” Utilizing local law 
enforcement through programs such as 287(g)5 and Secure 
Communities,6 ICE purports to prioritize the removal of immigrants 
who have committed dangerous crimes.7 But, investigations of these 
programs reveal that predominantly noncriminal undocumented 
immigrants and immigrants with nonserious violations have been 
targeted8 and that in implementing these programs, racial profiling9 
 
BORDER ENFORCEMENT ON UNAUTHORIZED MEXICAN MIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES 
(2006), available at http://www.bibdaily.com/pdfs/Cornelius%20testimony%208-2-06.pdf 
(recognizing that physical border-defense mechanisms constitute the only legislative reform 
measures that Congress has agreed on and enacted); Wayne A. Cornelius, Controlling 
‘Unwanted’ Immigration: Lessons From the United States, 1993–2004, 31 J. ETHNIC & 
MIGRATION STUD. 775, 776 (2005) (describing the U.S. immigration-control strategy as launched 
by President Clinton and continued through the presidency of George W. Bush); Bill Ong Hing, 
The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 121, 127–28 (2001) 
(outlining Operation Gatekeeper’s emphasis on deterrence of unauthorized migration). 
 4. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., supra note 2. 
 5. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006); Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) 
Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/287g/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2011) (describing the statute previously known as 
287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, which gives state or 
local law enforcement delegated authority for immigration enforcement within their 
jurisdictions). 
 6. Tanya Pérez-Brennan, Illinois Drops Secure Communities as Fierce Opposition Mounts 
in Massachusetts, Other States, FOX NEWS LATINO (May 5, 2011), http://latino.foxnews.com/ 
latino/politics/2011/05/05/illinois-drops-secure-communities-fierce-opposition-mounts-
massachussetts/ (illustrating the trend of states, including Massachusetts, that are beginning to 
withdraw from participating in the federal program that opponents believe is part of an anti-
immigration trend); Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2011) (describing the program 
that fingerprints those arrested and booked, and checks them against FBI criminal history records 
and DHS immigration records; ICE then determines if immigration enforcement action is 
required, considering the arrestee’s immigration status and criminal history as well as the severity 
of the crime). 
 7. Memorandum of Agreement Between U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec. Immigration & 
Customs Enforcement and State Identification Bureau, available at http://www.ice.gov/ 
doclib/foia/secure_communities/securecommunitiesmoatemplate.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2011) 
(template of agreement to create secure communities). 
 8. DORA SCHRIRO, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 
(2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf 
(stating that the majority of individuals identified by 287(g) and the Criminal Alien Program 
(CAP) were “non-criminal aliens”—immigrants not convicted of crimes—65 percent for 287(g) 
and 57 percent for CAP); U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., SECURE COMMUNITIES IDENT/IAFIS INOPERABILITY MONTHLY STATISTICS 
THROUGH APR. 30, 2011, at 2 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-
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and other civil rights violations have taken place.10 Raids and audits 
of workplaces have also contributed to significant removals of 
noncriminal noncitizens, while they have failed to hold some 
unscrupulous employers accountable for the labor abuses that may 
have taken place there.11 
In total, ICE removed 358,886 individuals in 2008, up from 
189,026 in 2001.12 The number of removals for 2010 was a record-
 
stats/nationwide_ 
interoperability_stats-fy2011-feb28.pdf (detailing that from 2008 until now, 84 percent of all 
Alien IDENT matches resulted in the identification of an alien charged with an L2 or L3 lesser 
crime, which includes traffic and immigration status violations, while only 16 percent were 
charged with or convicted of an L1 serious crime). 
 9. AARTI SHAHANI & JUDITH GREENE, JUSTICE STRATEGIES, LOCAL DEMOCRACY ON 
ICE: WHY STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO BUSINESS IN FEDERAL IMMIGRATION 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 2 (2009), available at http://www.justicestrategies.org/sites/default/files/JS-
Democracy-On-Ice.pdf (asserting that race, not crime, propelled 287(g) growth; for example, 
61 percent of targeted regions had violent and property crimes lower than the national average, 
87 percent of regions targeted had Latino populations higher than the national average, and 
regions heavily impacted by “criminal illegal alien” activity were not prioritized); DEBORAH M. 
WEISSMAN ET AL., THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT LAWS: 
287(G) PROGRAM IN NORTH CAROLINA 29 (2009), available at http://www.law.unc.edu/ 
documents/clinicalprograms/287gpolicyreview.pdf (pointing out that 287(g) encourages racial 
profiling, with Hispanics being disproportionately targeted for minor traffic offenses for the 
purpose of deportation); The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic Profiling in the United States, AM. 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June 29, 2009), http://www.aclu.org/human-rights_racial-justice/ 
persistence-racial-and-ethnic-profiling-united-states (explaining that racial minorities continue to 
be unfairly victimized when authorities investigate, stop, frisk, or search individuals based upon 
subjective identity-based characteristics rather than on identifiable evidence of illegal activity; 
victims continue to be racially or ethnically profiled while they work, drive, shop, pray, travel, 
and stand on the street). 
 10. AFTON BRANCHE, DRUM MAJOR INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, THE COST OF FAILURE: THE 
BURDEN OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN AMERICA’S CITIES 18 (2011), available at 
http://www.drummajorinstitute.org/pdfs/DMI_Cost_of_Failure.pdf (“[I]mmigrants who are 
merely arrested on the suspicion of having committed a crime can be identified and deported, 
regardless of their guilt or innocence.”); Michael Kaufman, Note, Detention, Due Process, and 
the Right to Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 4 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 113, 139–44 (2008) 
(describing detention of non-citizens that can last for months and years without appointed 
counsel, leading to their loss of liberty and an impairment of their ability to prepare a defense to 
removal); Bridget Kessler, Comment, In Jail, No Notice, No Hearing . . . No Problem? A Closer 
Look at Immigration Detention and the Due Process Standards of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 571, 591 (2009) (examining the ambiguous 
language of custody procedures regulation that allows DHS to detain individuals for extended 
periods of time without justification). 
 11. Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker as Private Attorney General: A Model for 
Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247 (2009) 
(exploring the subversion of civil rights imperatives when immigration enforcement authorities 
detain and deport undocumented workers who may have experienced workplace exploitation). 
 12. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2009 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/enforcement_ar_2009.pdf. 
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breaking 392,862.13 All the while, backlogs for family- and 
employment-based immigration applications persist, resulting in 
processing delays of more than a decade under some circumstances.14 
Numerical limitations on annual visa issuances exacerbate these 
lengthy waits; an estimated 5.8 million individuals approved for 
family-based immigrant visas are still waiting to receive them.15 
Meanwhile, anti-immigrant state laws, such as Arizona’s 
SB 1070,16 complicate efforts toward a fairer and more efficient 
immigration system by enacting nonuniform standards for 
immigration-related crimes and mandating inadequately trained state 
law enforcement officers to act as immigration enforcers. Seven 
lawsuits, including one from the U.S. Department of Justice,17 assert 
that SB 1070 unconstitutionally regulates immigration matters, 
violating longstanding Supreme Court jurisprudence that establishes 
the federal government’s exclusive authority over immigration.18 
Even after two federal courts ruled significant provisions of the law 
 
 13. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE 
TOTAL REMOVALS 1 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/ero-
removals.pdf. 
 14. NAT’L VISA CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNUAL REPORT OF IMMIGRANT VISA 
APPLICANTS IN THE FAMILY-SPONSORED AND EMPLOYMENT-BASED PREFERENCES REGISTERED 
AT THE NATIONAL VISA CENTER 2 (2010), available at http://travel.state.gov/pdf/ 
WaitingListItem.pdf (indicating that as of October 2010, 4,683,393 family-sponsored and 
employment-based visa applications were still wait-listed). 
 15. Reuniting Families Act, CONGRESSMAN MIKE HONDA, http://honda.house.gov/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=90&Itemid=76 (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) 
(“There are currently 5.8 million people in the family immigration backlog waiting 
unconscionable periods of time to reunite with their family members.”). 
 16. S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010). 
 17. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339 (9th Cir. 2011); Order, Escobar v. Brewer, No. 
4:10-cv-00249 (D. Ariz. Aug. 31, 2010); Judgment of Dismissal in a Civil Case, Frisancho v. 
Brewer, No. 2:10-cv-00926 (D. Ariz. Aug. 24, 2010); Complaint, League of United Latin Am. 
Citizens v. Arizona, No. 2:10-cv-1453 (D. Ariz. July 9, 2010); Complaint, Friendly House v. 
Whiting, No. 2:10-cv-1061 (D. Ariz. May 17, 2010); Complaint, Nat’l Coal. of Latino Clergy & 
Christian Leaders v. Arizona, No. 2:10-cv-00943 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010); Complaint, Salgado v. 
Brewer, No. 2:10-cv-00951 (D. Ariz. Apr. 29, 2010). 
 18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating that Congress has the power to establish a 
uniform rule of naturalization.); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 
U.S. 581, 603–04 (1889) (declaring that the government has the power to exclude aliens who 
possess characteristics that Congress forbids, and the power must be exercised to maintain its 
independence). But see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (holding that Congress’s 
plenary power to create immigration law is subject to important constitutional limitations); INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941–42 (1983) (recognizing that although Congress has plenary authority, 
that authority must not offend other constitutional restrictions and be exercised in a 
constitutionally permissible manner). 
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unconstitutional,19 other states continue to enact similarly punitive 
laws.20 
What has culminated is a deeply emotional and polarized public 
debate over the rights of immigrants. On one side of the debate, 
immigration restrictionists favor tougher enforcement measures and 
may feel that the federal government is not doing enough to keep out 
newcomers and to remove those here unlawfully. On the other side, 
immigration liberals argue for less enforcement and additional 
pathways to legal resident status in the United States. Both seem to 
agree that the current immigration system is in a state of disrepair 
and in desperate need of reform.21 
President Obama has responded by pledging to make 
immigration reform a top priority. The administration’s official 
platform promotes safe, orderly, and legal migration that protects 
human rights, asylees, and human trafficking victims and the 
integration of legal immigrants, while it opposes unregulated and 
unauthorized migration.22 Yet, some commentators have observed 
that the administration’s current on-the-ground approach to 
immigration reflects an “enforcement now, enforcement forever” 
policy without any signs for meaningful reform.23 Nonetheless, 
 
 19. United States v. Arizona, 641 F.3d 339. 
 20. Utah Illegal Immigration Enforcement Act, H.B. 497, 2001 Gen. Sess. (Utah 2011); Julia 
Preston, Immigrants Are Focus of Harsh Bill in Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2011, at A10 
(comparing the Alabama immigration bill with Arizona’s SB 1070 and noting that Alabama takes 
immigration enforcement further by, among other things, disallowing illegal immigrant students 
from attending public colleges, obligating public schools to determine the immigration status of 
their students, and making it a crime for undocumented workers to apply for work); Court Blocks 
Implementation of Utah “Show Me Your Papers Law”, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (May 10, 
2011), http://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/court-blocks-implementation-utah-show-me-your-
papers-law (describing the actions of a federal district court in Salt Lake City that blocked 
implementation of HB 497). 
 21. N.Y. TIMES & CBS NEWS, POLL: APR. 28–MAY 2, 2010, at 7 (2010), available at 
http://documents.nytimes.com/new-york-timescbs-news-poll-immigration-overhaul (stating that 
89 percent of Americans from both sides of the immigration issue think that fundamental reform 
is necessary). 
 22. THE WHITE HOUSE, BUILDING A 21ST CENTURY IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 3 (May 2011), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/immigration_blueprint.pdf 
(describing the Obama administration’s goals for immigration reform with a focus on border 
security, accountability for businesses that exploit undocumented workers, family unification, 
encouragement of highly trained and educated immigrants to stay and develop industries, and 
accountability for those currently living in the United States illegally before they are allowed to 
be eligible for citizenship). 
 23. See Victor C. Romero, Decriminalizing Border Crossings, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 273, 
297–98 (2010) (criticizing Obama for continuing to enforce the harsh Bush-era policies, such as 
employer sanctions and criminal charges of entry without inspection, rather than focusing on 
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President Obama has publicly called for congressional action and 
some members of the legislature have introduced comprehensive 
immigration reform bills.24 It is therefore imperative for stakeholders 
to weigh in on the discussion to ensure that any immigration reform 
measure will accurately reflect the values of our society’s changing 
demographic, while it adheres to our country’s tradition of 
democracy, equality, and due process for all.25 
This special law review issue shares the perspectives of five 
student authors who critically examine and attempt to resolve the 
perplexing legal and normative dilemmas that key aspects of 
immigration reform present. Each author has focused on a subtopic 
within a major component of immigration reform: legal immigration, 
border enforcement, interior enforcement, immigration detention, 
and immigration courts.26 
We begin with the category of legal immigration, which 
includes both family-based and employment-based visas. To fulfill 
the policy objective of family unification, U.S. immigration laws 
permit some foreign nationals to legally immigrate to the United 
States through certain familial relationships. U.S. labor demands also 
provide the underlying rationale for employment-based immigration, 
permitted when an employer, who is unable to find a citizen 
employee and also meets other criteria, sponsors an immigrant 
 
reforming the broken immigration system); Kevin R. Johnson, Obama on Immigration: 
Enforcement Now, Enforcement Forever?, IMMIGRATIONPROF BLOG (Aug. 2, 2009), 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/2009/08/obama-on-immigration-enforcement-
now-enforcement-forever.html (highlighting protestors who demand a moratorium on the 
enforcement of Obama’s immigration policy, which has been more pervasive and devastating 
than practices executed under President Bush); see also Marcello Ballve, Immigrant Advocates 
Say Immigration Enforcement Worse Under Obama, ALTERNET (Mar. 8, 2010), 
http://www.alternet.org/story/145963/immigrant_advocates_say_immigration_enforcement_wors
e_under_obama (noting immigrant advocates’ criticism of Obama’s immigration enforcement 
practices). 
 24. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2010, S. 3932.IS, 111th Cong. (2010), 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111s3932is/pdf/BILLS-111s3932is.pdf; 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform for America’s Security and Prosperity of 2009, HR 4321. 
111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr4321ih/pdf/BILLS-
111hr4321ih.pdf. 
 25. MANUEL PASTOR & RHONDA ORTIZ, IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION IN LOS ANGELES: 
STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR FUNDERS 1–3 (Jan. 2009), available at http://csii.usc.edu/ 
documents/immigrant_integration.pdf (listing the demographics of immigrants in Los Angeles, 
where more than one-third of the population is foreign-born, nearly half of the workforce is 
composed of immigrants, and one million of the nation’s undocumented immigrants reside). 
 26. Other areas within the rubric of “comprehensive immigration reform,” such as 
legalization programs, are outside the scope of this issue. 
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employee.27 Yet, dysfunction in the legal immigration system and 
low caps on visa numbers28 have left those who have legal 
authorization to enter our country in a limbo status, sometimes 
waiting to immigrate for years.29 
Others, even those married to U.S. citizens, will never have a 
legal avenue of entry under the discriminatory peculiarities of current 
laws, which deny immigration equality to same-sex partners. Jay 
Strozdas addresses this particularly harsh reality of family-based 
immigration in his article, Trendlines: Court Decisions, Proposed 
Legislation, and Their Likely Impact on Binational Same-Sex 
Families. Because spousal immigration sponsorship for foreign 
partners depends on the federal government’s definition of marriage 
through the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which defines 
marriage as a legal union between a man and a woman,30 same-sex 
binational couples are excluded from laws that enable citizens to 
sponsor their foreign spouses to immigrate.31 As a consequence, 
Strozdas explains that thousands of same-sex couples are forced to 
live together in exile or separate. Shedding new light on this 
unsettling aspect of immigration, Strozdas draws from contemporary 
jurisprudence on marriage equality to advance promising reforms of 
the family immigration system that would rectify this inequity. 
Specifically, Strozdas examines three areas of recent doctrinal 
 
 27. 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006); 8 C.F.R § 204.5 (2011). 
 28. INA § 201(c)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c)(1)(A)(i) (2006) (480,000 baseline for family-
sponsored visas); INA § 201(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(d)(1)(A) (140,000 baseline for 
employment-based visas); INA § 201(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(e) (55,000 baseline for diversity visas). 
 29. Reuniting Families Act, supra note 15. 
 30. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
 31. SCOTT LONG ET AL., FAMILY, UNVALUED: DISCRIMINATION, DENIAL, AND THE FATE 
OF BINATIONAL SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER U.S. LAW (2006), available at http:// 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45db016e2.html (describing current immigration law, which 
discriminates against same-sex binational couples); Christopher A. Dueñas, Coming to America: 
The Immigration Obstacle Facing Binational Same-Sex Couples, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 813 
(2000) (finding that the United States is currently the only industrialized English-speaking 
country that does not grant same-sex partners immigration preferences); Adam Francoeur, The 
Enemy Within: Constructions of U.S. Immigration Law and Policy and the Homoterrorist Threat, 
3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 345, 356 (2007) (illustrating the political landscape where, within days 
after the passage of DOMA, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996), which strengthened procedures 
to remove immigrants from the United States and created a powerful tool for excluding Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) immigrants in the name of protecting and preserving 
U.S. values); Cori K. Garland, Say “I Do”: The Judicial Duty to Heighten Constitutional Scrutiny 
of Immigration Policies Affecting Same-Sex Binational Couples, 84 IND. L.J. 689, 700–02 (2009) 
(explaining that same-sex couples cannot benefit from spousal immigration). 
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development: Perry v. Schwarzenegger,32 which examined the 
constitutionality of Proposition 8, California’s prohibition of same-
sex marriage; judicial challenges to DOMA; and the Uniting 
American Families Act (UAFA), pending legislation that would 
provide immigration benefits to same-sex partners. Strozdas 
expounds on the significance of each development, and, in doing so, 
he extrapolates various strategies to achieve immigration equality for 
same-sex binational couples. 
While legal immigration avenues urgently require change, much 
of the current rhetoric around immigration policy focuses not on 
legal immigration but on preventing and punishing unauthorized 
migration. Immigration enforcement begins at the border, the first 
point of entry for many migrants, where the government’s strategy in 
recent years has concentrated on an increasingly militarized 
approach, including high numbers of border guards and virtual 
fencing, sometimes resembling a war zone.33 The public has also 
responded with its own vigilante-style monitoring: the minutemen.34 
Yet, while undocumented border crossing has always been a crime,35 
most immigrants caught at the border have traditionally been 
deported through civil removal proceedings rather than through 
criminal prosecutions.36 Recently, this trend has reversed37 due to 
enforcement programs like Operation Streamline, which targets 
 
 32. 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
 33. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
NATIONAL BORDER PATROL STRATEGY (2004), available at http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/ 
cgov/border_security/border_patrol/border_patrol_ohs/national_bp_strategy.ctt/national_bp_strat
egy.pdf (outlining the strategy and goals for the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, which 
include deterrence of illegal entry through technology, personnel, and improved infrastructure). 
 34. James Duff Lyall, Vigilante State: Reframing the Minuteman Project in the American 
Politics and Culture, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 260–61 (2009) (describing the Minutemen, a 
small vigilante group assembled in 2004 that began a private campaign against Latinos and 
Latinas by monitoring the border between the United States and Mexico). 
 35. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006) (outlining penalties for improper entry by alien); id. § 1326 
(outlining penalties for reentry of removed aliens). 
 36. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (recognizing that removal proceedings are 
civil, not criminal, and detention of aliens without process is not punishment). 
 37. Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 135, 135–37 (2009) (noting the increase in migration-related criminal offenses and 
immigration-related prosecutions in the past decade); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of 
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 469, 475–82 (2007) (discussing the “criminalization” of immigration law and how some 
aspects of criminal enforcement are being used in removals, which the Supreme Court has 
historically defined as civil proceedings). 
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popular entry points and refers all undocumented persons caught 
within those districts to the Department of Justice for en masse 
criminal prosecution.38 Those charged with unauthorized entry face 
jail sentences, deportation, and enhanced penalties if they are caught 
reentering the country.39 Supporters of the program claim that it has 
effectively deterred unauthorized migration,40 while critics contend 
that Operation Streamline has wasted resources and curtailed the due 
process rights of border entrants, who are subject to summary 
criminal proceedings.41 
In her article, Crossing Over: Assessing Operation Streamline 
and the Rights of Immigrant Criminal Defendants at the Border, 
Edith Nazarian examines the constitutional protection that Operation 
Streamline endangers and analyzes the normative implications of 
United States v. Roblero-Solis,42 a recent court decision that found 
Operation Streamline’s en masse proceedings impermissible under 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure rather than on 
constitutional grounds.43 While Nazarian agrees with the outcome of 
the case, she critiques the court’s rule-based reasoning as an implicit 
denial of the core constitutional principles that ought to serve to 
effectuate the rights of immigrant criminal defendants. Nazarian 
suggests an alternative approach, a theory of territoriality, which 
would confer full constitutional rights to noncitizens based on their 
 
 38. JOANNA LYDGATE, ASSEMBLY-LINE JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF OPERATION STREAMLINE 
(2010), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Operation_Streamline_Policy_Brief.pdf. 
In testimony before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 
Janet Napolitano reported that more than 30,000 prosecutions had occurred under Operation 
Streamline from April 1, 2010, to March 31, 2011. Secretary Janet Napolitano, Before the Senate 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs: “Securing the Border: Progress at the 
Federal Level”, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (May 4, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/ 
ynews/testimony/testimony_1304459606805.shtm [hereinafter Napolitano Testimony]. 
 39. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (indicating that a misdemeanor illegal entry carries a six-month 
maximum sentence); id. § 1326 (indicating that a felony reentry can carry a two-year maximum 
penalty or up to a twenty-year maximum if the migrant has a criminal record). 
 40. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., supra note 2. 
 41. LYDGATE, supra note 38, at 12 (“Despite their best efforts, it is extremely difficult for 
border jurisdictions to implement Operation Streamline without depriving migrants of procedural 
due process and effective assistance of counsel.”); Ted Robbins, Claims of Border Program 
Success Are Unproven, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/ 
story.php?storyId=129827870. 
 42. 588 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 43. Id. at 693–94; see also United States v. Diaz-Ramirez, No. 10-10230, slip op. at 3 (9th 
Cir. May 23, 2011) (distinguishing Roblero-Solis and its discussion of a violation of Rule 11 from 
a constitutional violation of due process). 
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physical presence in the United States. This, Nazarian argues, would 
better ensure that unlawful border entrants, if they are tried as 
criminal defendants, receive the same constitutional due process 
guarantees that apply to citizen criminal defendants. Anything less, 
Nazarian believes, would contribute to the deterioration of rights for 
all. 
Beyond the border, the government’s interior immigration 
enforcement strategy focuses on preventing unlawful presence44 and 
removing immigration violators.45 As discussed above, these efforts 
have been concentrated on partnerships with local and state law 
enforcement through programs such as Secure Communities46 and 
287(g).47 The workplace also continues to be a central aspect of the 
current administration’s interior immigration enforcement strategy,48 
with a focus on employer audits.49 
Workplace immigration enforcement first became official policy 
in 1986 with the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA),50 which Congress aimed at curbing unlawful migration by 
 
 44. In the agency’s first overall strategic plan, ICE noted that one of its primary objectives is 
to prevent unlawful presence by creating a culture of employer compliance with immigration 
related employment laws. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., ICE STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2010–2014, at 5–6 (2010), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/strategic-plan/strategic-plan-2010.pdf. 
 45. Id. at 6–7 (noting that key objectives of the agency include removing criminals, gang 
members, and aliens who overstay visas, and achieving efficiency in the removal process). 
 46. Secure Communities, supra note 6. 
 47. Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and 
Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/news/ 
library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited July 17, 2011). 
 48. Memorandum from Marcy M. Forman, Dir., Office of Investigations, U.S. Immigration 
& Customs Enforcement, to Assistant Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Worksite 
Enforcement Strategy 2 (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/ 
dro_policy_memos/worksite_enforcement_strategy4_30_2009.pdf (“The criminal prosecution of 
employers is a priority [for] worksite enforcement . . . and interior enforcement [of immigration 
laws].” (footnote omitted)). 
 49. U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, supra note 44, at 6 (noting that the 
agency plans to improve its auditing program and hire more auditors); Napolitano Testimony, 
supra note 38 (“Since January 2009, ICE has audited more than 4,600 employers suspected of 
employing unauthorized workers, debarred more than 315 companies and individuals, and 
imposed approximately $59 million in financial sanctions—more than the total amount of audits 
and debarments during the entire previous administration.”). 
 50. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006). Hiring workers not authorized to work in the United States was 
not illegal until IRCA passed in 1986. See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892–93 
(1984). 
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deterring the employment of undocumented immigrants.51 IRCA 
requires employers to screen their employees for work 
authorization52 and sanctions employers who knowingly hire 
undocumented immigrants.53 Twenty-five years later, IRCA’s 
objectives have not been achieved. IRCA has failed to limit an 
increasing undocumented population, and, even more disconcerting, 
some unscrupulous employers have misused their IRCA-conferred 
immigration screening power to threaten to deport undocumented 
workers who refuse to comply with exploitive working conditions.54 
Joseph Layne, in his article, Fighting a Losing Battle: IRCA’s 
Negative Impact on Law-Abiding Employers, builds on this 
unintended consequence to further argue that in addition to 
facilitating the abuse of undocumented workers, IRCA also hurts 
employers who desire to follow the law. Examining an 
underexplored area in the immigrant workers’ rights scholarship, 
Layne focuses on the role of law-abiding employers under the 
current workplace immigration enforcement regime. Analyzing post-
IRCA judicial developments that reinforce the primacy of 
immigration enforcement objectives over workplace protections,55 
Layne finds that employers who strictly adhere to employment and 
labor laws are at a serious market disadvantage as compared to 
unscrupulous employers, who are ironically empowered by IRCA to 
abscond labor laws and exploit workers who lack legal immigration 
status. 
Our country’s system of border and interior immigration 
enforcement, which is outlined above, is accompanied by an 
elaborate detention scheme. Immigrants who have allegedly violated 
immigration laws and are facing removal proceedings are held in 
 
 51. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002) (citing INS v. 
Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 194 n.8 (1991)) (stating that the IRCA 
makes “combating the employment of illegal aliens central to ‘[t]he policy of immigration law’”). 
 52. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b). 
 53. Id. § 1324a(e)(4)(A) (civil fines); id. § 1324a(f)(1) (criminal prosecution for employers 
who engage in a pattern practice of violations). 
 54. REBECCA SMITH ET AL., ICED OUT: HOW IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT HAS 
INTERFERED WITH WORKERS’ RIGHTS (2009), available at http://nelp.3cdn.net/ 
75a43e6ae48f67216a_w2m6bp1ak.pdf; Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the 
Workplace, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (2009); Michael J. Wishnie, The Border Crossed Us: Current 
Issues in Immigrant Labor, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 389 (2004). 
 55. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 147. 
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detention facilities, sometimes indefinitely.56 Theoretically, 
immigrant detention does not constitute punishment for a crime. Yet 
in practice, detained immigrants experience the loss of freedom 
similar to that in penal incarceration.57 Some argue that the 
guidelines and conditions of immigrant detention violate basic rights 
such as access to medical treatment58 and due process.59 Due to 
Congress’ plenary power over immigration policy, however, 
immigration issues receive only limited constitutional judicial 
review.60 
Whitney Chelgren, in her article, Preventive Detention 
Distorted: Why It Is Unconstitutional to Detain Immigrants Without 
Procedural Protections, undertakes the doctrinal and normative 
complexities of a dichotomous immigrant detention system, which is 
civil in theory yet penal in character. Chelgren illustrates the 
humanitarian and doctrinal problems that current immigrant 
detention practices raise, including harsh conditions of confinement, 
unreasonable durations of detention, and other violations of due 
process. Recognizing the normative premise on which immigrant 
detention was founded—that of prevention of flight rather than 
punishment for a crime—Chelgren concentrates her analysis on the 
 
 56. Antonio Ginatta, The Danger of Indefinite Detention, THE HILL (June 1, 2011, 4:21 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/164257-the-danger-of-indefinite-detention (“The 
House Judiciary committee plans on Thursday to move forward a bill to create a system of 
indefinite detention for immigrants in the United States.”). 
 57. SCHRIRO, supra note 8, at 21–25 (discussing the conditions of detention facilities while 
noting that the majority were built as jails and prisons and that many immigrants are detained in 
currently functional jails and prisons with pretrial and convicted inmates). 
 58. SUNITA PATEL & TOM JAWETZ, CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT IN IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION FACILITIES 3 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/prison/unsr_ briefing_ 
materials.pdf (“Among the most common complaint [sic] from detainees across the country is 
inadequate access to medical care.”); Riddhi Mukhopadhyay, Death in Detention: Medical and 
Mental Health Consequences of Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the United States, 7 
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 693 (2009). 
 59. Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 633 (2010) (stating that categories of mandatory detention are 
vague and that the detention system is “too unfair, inefficient, and expensive to be sustainable”); 
Kaufman, supra note 10, at 139–44. 
 60. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (finding that while the political branches 
have plenary power over immigration, that power is “subject to important constitutional 
limitations”); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365 (2002) (predicting that the plenary power doctrine 
will continue to be a limit on judicial review of immigration laws); Stephen H. Legomsky, Ten 
More Years of Plenary Power: Immigration, Congress, and the Courts, 22 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 925, 926 (1995). 
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constitutionality of practices at the pre-removal stage of immigrant 
detention. Drawing parallels with pretrial detention in the criminal 
justice system, Chelgren finds a complete absence of due process 
safeguards for immigrants in pre-removal detention, most 
importantly, a lack of individualized hearings. These constitutional 
violations prompt Chelgren to recommend an overhaul of the current 
detention system, which would adopt softer alternatives, such as 
supervised in-home detention, to better reflect the civil rather than 
penal theoretical foundation of immigrant detention. 
Among those immigrants detained and subject to removal for 
unlawful presence or other immigration violations, some may make a 
claim for relief from removal. Such claims are adjudicated by the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), an agency within 
the Department of Justice that operates as the nation’s immigration 
court system.61 EOIR judges conduct civil removal proceedings.62 In 
a typical removal proceeding, the immigration judge determines 
whether an individual from a foreign country should be allowed to 
enter or remain in the United States or be removed.63 Immigration 
judges may also grant asylum, cancellation of removal, adjustment of 
status, or other forms of relief.64 The immigration court is an 
administrative agency rather than an independent judiciary, and 
immigration judges are employees of the Department of Justice 
rather than federally appointed Article III judges.65 
Widespread agreement exists among judges, practitioners, 
immigrants, and advocates that the current immigration court system 
does not have the capacity to ensure the protection of due process 
rights.66 Immigration judges have been characterized as lacking 
 
 61. 8 C.F.R § 1003.0 (2011). 
 62. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006). 
 63. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.1, 1003.10. 
 64. Id. § 1240.11(a), (c). 
 65. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4). 
 66. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[A]djudication of these 
[immigration] cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal 
justice.”); Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench: An Ethical Perspective, 73 
BROOK. L. REV. 467, 492–93 (2008) (listing federal court decisions that criticize the current 
immigration court system, and citing anecdotal evidence of impartiality from practitioners); 
Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635, 1639 (2010) 
(noting that the immigration adjudication system has been criticized by both political parties for 
decades as being unfair, inaccurate, inconsistent, and inefficient). 
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impartiality.67 Removal proceedings are considered noncriminal and 
immigrants are therefore not provided with court-appointed 
counsel.68 Poor translation capacity and cultural differences have had 
the consequence of depriving immigrants of knowledge of their 
rights.69 Finally, increased immigration enforcement has led to an 
overload of immigration court cases.70 Many cases are then appealed 
up to the U.S. courts of appeals, overburdening the federal appellate 
court system.71 
Christen Chapman critically responds to the broken immigration 
court system in Relief from Deportation: An Unnecessary Battle. 
Chapman’s investigation into the current state of the immigration 
courts reveals a system that is corrupted by its increasingly 
adversarial approach to resolving immigration matters. Chapman 
notes that immigration courts have failed to implement the due 
process safeguards necessary for adversarial proceedings. 
Immigration proceedings, particularly adjudications for asylum or 
relief from removal, are dominated by the enforcement priorities of 
the ICE attorney. Noncitizen respondents are then deprived of the 
opportunity to effectively present the merits of their cases, frequently 
resulting in denials of relief. Chapman suggests an innovative 
 
 67. CTR. FOR IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS, PENN STATE LAW, PLAYING POLITICS AT THE BENCH: 
A WHITE PAPER ON THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S INVESTIGATION INTO THE HIRING PRACTICES 
OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES 57 (2009), available at http://law.psu.edu/_file/Playing% 
20Politics%20at%20the%20Bench%20101209.pdf (stating that the politicized hiring of 
unqualified immigration judges threatens necessary impartiality); Benedetto, supra note 66. 
 68. See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (providing the right to counsel in removal proceedings, but not at 
the government’s expense); OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK G1 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ 
statspub/fy10syb.pdf (showing that in 2010, aliens were not represented by legal counsel in 57 
percent of removal proceedings). 
 69. See Donna Ackermann, A Matter of Interpretation: How the Language Barrier and the 
Trend of Criminalizing Illegal Immigration Caused a Deprivation of Due Process Following the 
Agriprocessors, Inc. Raids, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 363 (2010). 
 70. See New Judge Hiring Fails to Stem Rising Immigration Case Backlog, 
TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE (TRAC), SYRACUSE UNIV. (June 7, 2011), 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/250/. 
 71. Legomsky, supra note 66, at 1646–47 (estimating a 30 percent appeal rate from the 
Board of Immigration Appeals to federal courts of appeals in fiscal year 2008, which has “created 
a now well-documented crisis for the federal courts”); Judicial Emergency Declared in District of 
Arizona, U.S. COURTS (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/NewsView/11-01-
25/Judicial_Emergency_Declared_in_District_of_Arizona.aspx (“The federal court in Arizona 
has the third highest criminal caseload among the nation’s 94 federal trial courts, driven by illegal 
immigration and drug smuggling across the U.S.-Mexico border. Criminal cases in that court 
have increased 65 percent since 2008.”). 
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proposal—that immigration courts move away from an adversarial 
system and toward a framework of inquisitorial adjudications. Such a 
system would eliminate the ICE attorney and place full fact-finding 
and adjudicatory power in the hands of the immigration judge, who 
would optimally balance the goals of immigration enforcement 
against the humanitarian interests of granting immigration relief to 
the noncitizen respondent. Chapman contends that an inquisitorial 
immigration court would achieve greater fairness and impartiality, 
and ensure that the noncitizen’s due process rights are properly 
protected. 
In sum, the five articles in this issue provide doctrinally 
comprehensive and normatively nuanced examinations of several 
key aspects of comprehensive immigration reform. Each article is 
also prescriptive, presenting theoretically unique yet practical, 
alternatives to current dilemmas in immigration law. These 
recommendations include the following: 
•  family-based immigration avenues should incorporate 
marriage equality for same-sex binational couples; 
•  unauthorized border entrants who undergo criminal 
prosecution should receive the due process protections 
that criminal defendants receive; 
•  workplace immigration enforcement policies and 
practices must not only prevent the exploitability of 
undocumented workers but should also protect law-
abiding employers; 
•  immigrant detention requires softer alternatives to reflect 
its civil and preventative objectives; and 
•  immigration courts ought to move away from an 
adversarial system and toward an inquisitorial system to 
better ensure fairness and impartiality in adjudications. 
As discussions of comprehensive immigration reform continue 
among lawyers, policymakers, scholars, and advocates, the 
contributions of these five articles will facilitate the development of 
immigration reform measures that reflect principles of immigrant 
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